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CONTRACT'S "MANY FUTURES" AFTER




Traditional contract is under attack. Professor Grant Gil-
more informs us that contract is dead1 and, more recently, Pro-
fessor Ian Macneil and others argue that traditional doctrine
does not reach much of the commercial exchange conduct for
which it was intended.2 These attacks are disturbing in view of
the apparent doctrinal stability of fundamental contract con-
cepts since the early twentieth century and the warm reception
given both Restatements. In an attempt to evaluate the ongoing
commentary on traditional contract law, this Article will ex-
amine these attacks and the jurisprudential assumptions upon
which they are based.
Traditional contract doctrine is based on the fundamental
concept that the doctrine of consideration separates those
promises that will be enforced from those that will not be. The
central idea underlying consideration is that enforcement should
be granted only those promises that are given in exchange for
other promises or conduct.4 This formulation has been criticized
recently for not articulating the reasons for its enforcement of
some promises,5 for being the exclusive ground for promise
enforcement instead of simply one ground,6 and for other
* Professor of Law, Mercer University Law School; B.A., 1969, J.D., 1972, Vander-
bilt University; LL.M., 1979, Columbia University.
1. G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
2. E.g., Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 691 (1974).
3. See A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNmTAcrs § 110 (1963); Brody, An Exercise in Socio-
logical Jurisprudence: Herein the Signal Theory, 20 DE PAUL L. REV. 791, 801 (1971);
see generally P. ATIYAH, CONSIDERATION IN CONTRACTS, A FUNDAMENTAL RESTATEMENT
(1971); Fridman, The Basis of Contractual Obligation, an Essay in Speculative Juris-
prudence, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 1 (1974).
4. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 75 and Comment a (1932).
5. See Brody, supra note 3, at 793-94.
6. See Ellinghaus, Consideration Reconsidered Considered, 10 MELB. L. REV. 267,
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reasons.7 Several commentators recently have proposed reform
or total abolition of the consideration requirement.8 Yet, despite
the present flurry of academic discussion, no serious attempt to
overthrow completely the present doctrine appears to be
brewing.
Although there is no wholesale revolution in progress, a
substantial fifth column action has been mounted against bar-
gained-for exchange as the exclusive basis for enforcing
promises.9 Thus, in addition to bargained-for exchange, justifi-
able reliance on a promise is now considered to be an adequate
basis for enforcement of that promise.10 The doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel has been used to supplement traditional bar-
gained-for exchange, in effect adding another category of
promises for which legal enforcement will be granted. Similarly,
a promise now may be enforced when failure to do so would re-
sult in unjust enrichment-a category frequently labeled quasi-
con.tract or promissory restitution.11
273 (1975).
7. See, e.g., A. CORBIN, supra note 3, § 111. For a discussion of the history of some
of the present problems of consideration, see Barton, Early History of Consideration, 85
LAW Q. REv. 372 (1969); Brody, supra note 3, at 857-58.
8. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 3, at 855 (presenting author's signal theory); Chloros,
The Doctrine of Consideration and the Reform of the Law of Contract: A Comparative
Analysis, 17 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 137, 158-64 (1968) (recommending, inter alia, changing
the English rule to enforce any "serious" promise); Ellinghaus, supra note 6, at 283-84
(recommending changing the rule generally to enforce all promises); Fridman, supra note
3, at 5-8 (recommending changing the rule to enforce those promises which manifest the
parties' intention to be bound); Treitel, Consideration: A Critical Analysis of Professor
Atiyah's Fundamental Restatement, 50 AuSTL. L.J. 439, 449 (1976) (recommending cod-
ification of the presently recognized exceptions). For a generally supportive discussion of
the reasons for the doctrine, see Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799
(1941); Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 929 (1958).
9. See Ellinghaus, supra note 6, at 272-74 (noting that the exclusive formulation of
bargained-for exchange as the basis for enforcement of promises seems to be the primary
problem with consideration as presently formulated).
10. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973). To
enforce a promise on the theory of promissory estoppel, courts usually impose four
requirements: a promissory obligation; definite, substantial and foreseeable reliance;
reliance induced by the promise; and no alternative for avoiding injustice. Id. See A.
CORBIN, supra note 3, § 206; S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACT,
§§ 139-40 (3d ed. 1957); Note, Promissory Estoppel-Measure of Damages, 13 VAND. L.
R v. 705, 705-07 (1960). In England it appears that justifiable reliance on a promise is a
defense against imposition of liability, but is not a sufficient basis for imposing liability.
See Fridman, supra note 3, at 12-15.
11. For specific applications of this general idea, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS §§ 85-89 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973); A. CORBIN, supra note 3, §§ 19, 234. For a
[Vol. 32
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Thus, the courts have relaxed'the requirement of traditional
bargained-for exchange, but have not engaged in a full, frontal
assault on the doctrine. Yet, concludes Professor Gilmore, the
exceptions have so eroded the rule that a frontal assault is no
longer necessary.12 His thesis is that classical contract theory,
originally an ivory tower construct of Langdell, Holmes, and
Williston, has disappeared as an effective dispute resolver. The
three central tenets of this theory have been eroded away to
nothing: (1) limited liability based upon classic consideration
has been exploded by promissory estoppel and quasi-contract;13
(2) the absolute character of this liability has been weakened se-
riously by doctrines such as frustration, mistake, and impossibil-
ity, which excuse nonperformance of the breaching party; and
(3) the limited damages available under the classic system have
been expanded greatly by punitive damage awards. From this
erosion, Professor Gilmore concludes that contract is returning
to the general civil liability tort classification from which it
came.1
4
Professor Macneil, on the other hand, focuses not on the ac-
tions of courts and restaters, but on those of most commercial
contract makers. 5 Following a school of thought which focuses
on empirical study of the behavior of commercial parties engag-
ing in bargaining and exchange,11 he argues that contract law
simply does not regulate much of the commercial behavior it
should and does not regulate properly that which it does. He
argues that, while most exchanges involve parties motivated by
concerns about continuing commercial relations as well as con-
cerns about specific commercial transactions, contract law as-
sumes that only commercial transactions are relevant influences
and subjects for discussion. Thus, in his view, contract law
more extensive treatment of the subject of restitution generally, see Wade, Restitution
for Benefits Conferred Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REv. 1183 (1966).
12. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 87..
13. For an extended review of Professor Gilmore's thesis and criticisms, see notes
18-75 and accompanying text infra.
14. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 87.
15. For an extended review of Professor Macneil's thesis and criticisms, see notes
76-131 and accompanying text infra.
16. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965); J. HURST, LAW AND
THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM (1956); J. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE LEGAL
HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915 (1964); Macaulay, Non-Con-
tractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55 (1963).
1981]
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should be reformed to allow consideration of these ongoing corn-
mercial relations.
This Article will discuss first the arguments of Professor
Gilmore and review the major criticisms of them. The theories
and conclusions of Professor Macneil and his forerunners will
then be considered, followed by a review of their criticisms. The
Article will conclude with a discussion and comparison of the
jurisprudential assumptions and underpinnings of each of these
"graveyard theorists 1 7 to place their respective arguments in a
usable context. This context then will be used to articulate the
unanswered questions in the current discussions of contracts.
II. THE DEATH OF CONTRACT-OVERVIEW AND CRITICISM
A. Overview
The Death of Contract18 argues that courts no longer use
classical contract theory to resolve disputes about promises. Pro-
fessor Gilmore begins by noting that while Macneil, Friedman,
and Macaulay attempt to describe empirically how contracting
parties actually behave, his purpose is to portray how and why
the death of classical contract theory occurred-"assembling the
trees into a forest."1 9. To this end, he separates discussion of the
history of the classical theory in Chapters I and II from the dis-
cussion of decline and fall in Chapter III. "Conclusions and
Speculations" are treated in the last chapter.
The discussion of history begins with the relationship of
classical contract theory to the predominantly laissez faire eco-
nomic system of the nineteenth century.20 In that economic sys-
tem, contracts emerged as an important branch of commercial
law as goods and "claims to money based on their manufacture
and sale" 21 became significant repositories of wealth. Enforce-
able promises exchanged by commercial parties were necessary
to manage wealth of great magnitude. Though he notes that the
opposite view is commonly held, Professor Gilmore argues that
the idea of a general theory of contract grew out of a number of
17. See Milhollin, More on the Death of Contract, 24 CATH. L. REv. 29, 31 (1974)
(originating the term "graveyard theorists").
18. G. GILMORE, supra note 1.
19. Id. at 3, n.1.
20. Id. at 6-8, 33-34, 94-96.
21. Id. at 8-9.
[Vol. 32
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specialized bodies of law regulating particular kinds of commer-
cial agreements and transactions.22
Yet, according to Gilmore, the classical contract theory was
not a natural product of its times. The crux of his historical
treatment is that the theory was an ivory tower abstraction cre-
ated by Langdell, philosophically developed by Holmes, and sys-
tematized by Williston. Thus, Langdell "stumbled" 2 upon the
general, unitary theory of contract and used it in his treatises
and in his newly developing case method of teaching. This crea-
tion was a natural result of Langdell's wish to develop a deduc-
tive science of law and suffered from its lack of focus on actual
problems and events arising from typical bargains.2 4 Conse-
quently, the utility of the classical theory's unitary system of
contract liability was questionable from the beginning because it
lacked any relationship to the real world.
For Gilmore, Holmes, not Langdell, was the critical archi-
tect of this abstract creation. Holmes provided the philosophical
underpinnings of this system and added the crucial objective
theory of contract.25 According to Gilmore, Holmes' system of
contract rested on three great philosophical pillars, which in
turn rested on the foundation of objective theory of contract.
The first principle was the limited nature of liability of one per-
son to another for promises made. Promises were enforceable
only if supported by consideration in the form of bargained-for
exchange.26 Despite existing authority supporting a subjective
theory, Holmes reinforced this strict requirement of considera-
tion by articulating an objective standard for evaluating the bar-
22. Id. at 9-12, 12 n.18.
23. Id. at 12-13. In the same vein, Gilmore goes on to note Langdell's "unexcep-
tional" intellectual abilities and lack of creativity. Id.
24. See id. at 13. Accord, Friedman & Macaulay, Contract Law and Contract
Teaching: Past, Present and Future, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 805. For his view that courts at
this time were overly concerned with mechanical jurisprudence and elaborate systems
based upon deductive logic, see Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Causes and Cure, 70 YALE
L.J. 1037, 1041-42 (1961).
25. G. GLMoRE, supra note 1, at 14-21 (philosphical underpinnings), 35-53 (objec-
tive theory). Gilmore describes Holmes as believing "[t]he law moved from 'subjective' to
'objective,' from 'internal' to 'external,' from 'informal' to 'formal."' Id. at 41-42. When
rules are made more objective, the fact questions posed by their application become
much simpler and problems originally perceived as issues of fact become issues of law.
Objective rules determine legal results from the external, observable acts of parties
rather than from their subjective intentions.
26. Id. at 18-20.
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gaining conduct of parties.2 ' The second pillar required absolute
liability, when it was imposed; here again the objective theory of
contract assisted by converting troublesome questions of fact
into questions of law.28 The third pillar required money damages
to be kept low and aimed at compensation, not punishment. The
objective theory aided this principle by articulating objective
standards for potentially subjective concepts such as foresee-
ability and by converting ambiguous fact questions for the jury
into narrow questions of law for the judge.29
The philosophy having been provided by Holmes, Gilmore
argues, the sole task remaining for Williston was to serve as the
system builder and restater. To do this, he first had to develop
the "correct" system of contract law and, second, he had to tor-
ture the facts and reasoning of cases to support the system in
matters such as the "rule" of consideration 0 and the factual
problems of cases such as Dickinson v. Dodds.31 Thus, according
to Gilmore, Williston's system was elegant analytically, but was
unsupported by actual judicial decisions. In addition, the sys-
tem's analytical rigidity made it unable to respond to changes in
commercial practices and ultimately contributed to its decline. 2
The decline began, Professor Gilmore argues in Chapter III,
almost from the time of the system's creation. Based primarily
on English cases, the system was never as universally accepted
as Williston would have us believe.33 The attack on the system
came in two forms. First, Cardozo subtly undermined it from
within by his judicial craftsmanship, finding bargained-for ex-
change in unlikely places.3 4 Second, Corbin confronted it di-
27. Id. at 35-41. Holmes did give Williston the objective theory, which was useful in
ruling out messy evidence questions and "len[ding] itself beautifully to the abstraction
that makes possible doctrinal coherence." Gordon, Book Review, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1216,
1232.
28. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 13-18, 45-48. For example, mistake or impossibil-
ity could serve as a basis for avoiding liability only if the mistake or the impossibility
was objective.
29. Id. at 48-53.
30. Id. at 21-28. The cases discussed by Gilmore are Harris v. Watson, 170 Eng.
Rep. 94 (K.B. 1791) (concerning an agreement by seamen to continue to work a ship
shorthanded and in danger); Stilk v. Myrick, 170 Eng. Rep. 851, 1168 (K.B. 1809); and
Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876) (concerning revocation of offers).
31. 2 Ch. D. (1876). See id. at 28-33.
32, Id. at 33-34.
33. Id. at 55.57.
34. Id. at 57.
[Vol. 32
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rectly in his insistence on studying the operative facts of actual
cases.35 The classical theorists, primarily Williston, responded to
these challenges with the restatement idea, but even here the
erosion was apparent. Williston was able to include section 75
which articulated bargained-for exchange as the basis for en-
forceability. However, Corbin's relentless discussion of a number
of reliance cases which did not fit the traditional theory resulted
in new section 90 on promissory estoppel. This synthesis of Wil-
liston's and Corbin's views gave the first Restatement of Con-
tracts its peculiarly schizophrenic nature.38 Even early in its his-
tory, the classical doctrine was subject to serious exceptions.
The exceptions have now swallowed the rule, Professor Gil-
more next argues. The old theory has been dismantled, and con-
tract is merging back into tort. No longer are Holmes' central
philosophical pillars used effectively by the courts. First, the
traditional notion of consideration is not the exclusive basis for
finding liability based upon a promise; indeed, it is not even a
primary basis.3 7 Promissory estoppel has replaced bargained-for
exchange whenever there is reliance.38 Liability for benefit re-
ceived, quasi-contract, is gaining acceptance, although somewhat
unevenly. 9 Thus, liability premised on enforcement of a promise
typically can be found without reference to orthodox considera-
tion except when no party has changed his position in reliance
on the promise and no benefit has been conferred. The abolition
of contractually based defenses, such as the statute of frauds in
promissory estoppel or quasi-contract cases, also indicates that
the source of liability is distinct from that of traditional contract
law.40 Other related developments also support the general aban-
35. Id. at 57-58.
36. Id. at 58-65. One could argue instead that the Restatement achieved a new syn-
thesis; however, it did not synthesize the rules so much as to articulate two potentially
conflicting rules. Other examples of the synthesizing process discussed are third party
beneficiaries and their rights, anticipatory breach, excuse resulting from impossibility or
frustration, and recovery by a plaintiff in default. Interestingly, Professor Gilmore took a
somewhat different view of the Restatement in 1961; he viewed it as an attempt to keep
the mushrooming common-law system from falling under its own weight. Gilmore, supra
note 23, at 1044-45.
37. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 66. For a discussion of the English rule, see
Chloros, supra note 8, at 141; Fridman, supra note 3, at 18-20.
38. G. GiLMORE, supra note 1, at 72.
39. Id. at 72-76. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89A (Tent. Draft No.
2, 1965).
40. G. GmMORE, supra note 1, at 87-90.
1981]
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donment of the classical theory's bargained-for exchange re-
quirement in favor of other bases of liability.41 Thus, it is
argued, the central feature of the old system, bargained-for ex-
change, simply has ceased to be the exclusive or even a substan-
tial basis for enforcement of promises. The traditional theory of
consideration, therefore, does not effectively restrict contract
liability.
A similar erosion has been at work on the second pillar of
the classical system-the idea that liability, when imposed, is
absolute. In construction cases, for example, recovery is typically
granted a breaching party for progress payments made in excess
of damages suffered. 2 Similarly, the impossibility defense in
sales law, excusing performance only when it becomes impossi-
ble, has been expanded into "frustration" and "mistake" excus-
ing performance whenever the world does not turn out to be as
the parties expected.4 3 Absolute liability, therefore, is no longer
the effective rule of decision.
The final pillar of the classical system, remedies for breach
aimed only at compensation, is also crumbling. Unlike the situa-
tion half a century ago, specific performance frequently is availa-
ble. Courts award recovery of lost profits instead of the market-
price differential with increasing frequency, and some courts
even overtly award punitive damages in contract cases.4 The
41. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 76-77. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONMCrs
§ 89B (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1965) (firm offers). Professor Gilmore notes that illusory
promises and mutuality of obligation are no longer effective-courts simply imply mini-
mal promises or obligations to get around these doctrines.
42. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 78-79.
43. Id. at 80-83. The Uniform Commercial Code speaks of "occurrence of a contin-
gency the nonoccurence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was
made . . . ." U.C.C. § 2-615.
44. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 83-85. A commentator has observed recently that
these punitive damage awards "really represent an outgrowth of a heretofore camou-
flaged doctrine rather than the announcement of any startingly new legal principles."
Sullivan, Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: The Reality and Illusion of Legal
Change, 61 MINN. L. REV. 207, 247 (1977).
Many of these awards occur in insurance cases when an insurer unjustifiably refuses
to pay claims; often the insurer is guilty of egregious conduct. Allowing punitive damages
under these circumstances has been justified by the argument that the common law al-
ways has allowed punitive damages to protect "a special public interest in preventing
oppressive breaches of certain private contracts where a service needed by a majority of
the public is at stake." Note, Indiana's Allowance of Punitive Damages in Contract
Actions Against Insurance Companies: How New Is It?, 55 IND. L.J. 563, 564 (1980). For
a comprehensive review of the theoretical grounds for such awards and their implications
[Vol. 32
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merger of contract back into tort is exemplified by three Califor-
nia cases, which essentially fail to distinguish between contract
and tort claims in cases concerning both breach of promise as a
contract and breach of the duty arising from the promise as a
tort.45 The tendency of modern products liability law to use tort-
like damage measures and to avoid the contract defenses of priv-
ity, disclaimer, and notice also is cited.46
With bargained-for exchange no longer the exclusive basis
of promissory liability, absolute liability in decline, and remedies
exploding well beyond the restrictions of classical theory, the
death of classical contract is announced. Although he argued
earlier that the classical theory was more a creature of the ivory
tower academicians than the courts,4 7 in his post-mortem Pro-
fessor Gilmore attributes the death primarily to replacement of
the nineteenth century laissez faire economic system with the
twentieth century welfare state.48 The doctrine is no longer re-
sponsive to the commercial and social needs it was designed to
serve and, not surprisingly, has been replaced. The classical the-
ory converted fact questions into legal questions because of its
distrust of the civil jury, and the contemporary decline of the
civil jury lessened the need for this use of the theory.49 Professor
for all contracts, see Holmes, Is There Life After Gilmore's Death of Con-
tract-Inductions From a Study of Commercial Good Faith in First Party Insurance
Contracts, 65 CORNEL L. REv. 330 (1980). This article argues that courts now blend
equity, contract, and tort principles "in requiring parties to exhibit good faith and fair
conduct in the performance and discharge of contract duties." Id. at 335. It concludes
that this blending signals only the limitation of classical contract theory, not its death.
45. G. GmMORE, supra note 1, at 91-92 (discussing Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583,
364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 987 (1962); Connor v. Great
Western Say. and Loan Ass'n, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968); Heyer v. Flaig, 74
Cal. Rptr. 225, 449 P.2d 161 (1969)).
46. Id. at 92-94: The liability, however, now is not based on classical tort law, but on
a new theory. For a presentation of the thesis that the law is moving from tort to con-
tract for personal injury loss distribution, see O'Connell, The Interlocking Death and
Rebirth of Contract and Tort, 75 MICH. L. Rav. 659 (1977).
47. See notes 23-32 and accompanying text supra.
48. G. GILMoRE, supra note 1, at 94-96. Accord, Brody, supra note 3, at 802;
Fridman, silpra note 3, at 22. "The development of contract is largely an incident of
commercial and industrial enterprises that involve a greater anticipation of the future
than is necessary in a simpler and more primitive economy." Cohen, The Basis of Con-
tract, 46 HARv. L. REV. 553, 555 (1933).
49. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 98-100. Professor Speidel summarizes this attitude
as follows: "The attitude toward contract can now be described as 'easier in, easier out,
but greater potential liability while you were there.' Speidel, An Essay on the Reported
Death and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1167 (1975).
9
Strasser: Contract's "Many Futures" After Death; Unanswered Questions of Sc
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Gilmore concludes with the idea that the pendulum, which
swung away from the classical system, may now be swinging
back; he speculates that a new Langdell is waiting in the wings
to start the business of system building again.
B. Criticism"
To the extent that classical contract law came into existence
in response to the market economy of the laissez faire nine-
teenth century, a role for it still exists coextensively with the
rule of a market economy today. In a perceptive recent treat-
ment of the respective roles of public and private economic ac-
tivity, Arthur Okun found a continuing role for private markets:
"I regard it as vital that private enterprise continue to be the
main mechanism for organizing economic activity in those areas
where experimentation and innovation are important, and in
those where flexibility matters more than accountability. ' 51 Be-
cause a free-market ideology and a sphere of activity appropri-
ate for its exercise exist today, legal rules based upon these
should continue to have a legitimate role to play.52 While the
area of activity appropriately controlled by free-market forces
may be smaller than in Langdell's day, the continued existence
of such an area makes one suspect that Professor Gilmore over-
stated the death of contract.
Substantial criticism of Professor Gilmore's portrayal of the
birth of contract also exists. Specifically, Professor Gilmore's
treatment of Langdell's importance in originating a unitary the-
ory of contract has been attacked as historically inaccurate. Pro-
fessor Gordley pointed out that the idea of a general unitary
theory of contract has existed in the continental civil-law sys-
50. See, e.g., Mooney, The Rise and Fall of Classical Contract Law: A Response to
Professor Gilmore, 55 OR. L. REv. 155 (1976); Speidel, supra note 46; Gordley, Book
Review, 89 HARV. L. REv. 452 (1975); Gordon, supra note 26; Reitz, Book Review, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 697 (1975). Danzig collects citations to all the commentary on this book.
Danzig, The Death of Contract and the Life of the Profession, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1125,
1125 n.2 (1977).
51. A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 61 (1975). The relation-
ship of contract law to private markets is discussed in section IIIB. of this Article.
52. Speidel, supra note 49, at 1171. See Gordon, supra note 27, 1234-37. Approxi-
mately 80% of the economy is not classed appropriately as governmentally regulated,
and the regulated sector has grown only slightly since the Great Depression. G. NUTTER
& H. EINHORN, ENTERPRISE MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1899-1958 (1969).
[Vol. 32
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tems since the eleventh century and has been taught in England
since the twelfth." Concerning the development of English and
American law generally, Professor Mooney persuasively argued
that treatises on the common law included a unitary theory of
contract as early as 1790 and showed that at least five such trea-
tises had been written by the time Langdell was thought to have
created the idea. 4 Viewing Langdell as the ivory tower creator
of such a system lends no support to the idea that the system
was adopted in response to the needs of the laissez faire society
which used it-although they are not necessarily inconsistent.
At a minimum, these commentators raise serious questions
about Gilmore's historical view of Langdell's role.
The most serious historical criticism of Professor Gilmore's
thesis, however, was directed at his treatment of Holmes' role.
First, Holmes as the contract system builder conflicts with his
generally prevailing image as a realist, a pragmatist, and one not
seriously interested in building elaborate systems of law.55 Thus,
no apparent reason exists for the author of "[t]he life of the law
is not logic, the life of the law is experience""' to have had much
interest in building the philosophical underpinnings and analyti-
cal constructs of a classical contract law system. Second, Profes-
sor Gilmore's view of Holmes as the originator of the bargained-
for exchange requirement was weakened by well-documented re-
search indicating that the notion of bargained-for exchange pre-
dated Holmes.57 Finally, Holmes' own words attack Langdell's
casebook and his aim in teaching with cases 5 5-- a curious atti-
tude toward a fellow architect of the same grand system. Profes-
sor Mooney also closely reviewed the cases and opinions which
Williston is accused of torturing to fit his system and concluded
that Professor Gilmore "failed to substantiate his charge that
53. Gordley, supra note 50, at 453. Professor Gordley argues that Langdell contrib-
uted to consideration by avoiding some of the then existing problems with the civil-law
concept of causa. Id. at 457-63.
54. Mooney, supra note 50, at 164-67.
55. See Gordon, supra note 27, at 1231-32; Mooney, supra note 50, at 167-69. Gil-
more more recently described Holmes: "In this bleak and terrifying universe, the func-
tion of law, as Holmes saw it, is simply to channel private aggressions in an orderly,
perhaps in a dignified fashion." G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 49 (1977).
56. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1951). Holmes was not viewed as a contracts
revolutionary by Corbin or Williston. See Mooney, supra note 50, at 169.
57. See Gordley, supra note 50, at 458-59, 463-67; Mooney, supra note 50, at 169-71.
58. See Speidel, supra note 49, at 1171 (quoting the Holmes criticism).
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Holmes and Williston 'distorted' decisions to fit their precon-
ceived theories."59
Several additional historical criticisms deserve mention. It
has been argued that at least two characteristics of the classical
system were developed to serve social purposes and not simply
as elegant trappings of an abstract theory: (1) the absolute char-
acter of contract theory was a by-product of its potential for so-
cial engineering uses,60 and (2) the conversion of fact questions
into law questions was designed to achieve certainty in a com-
mercial society perceived to be in need of it.61 Professor Gordley
concluded that the problem with Professor Gilmore's history is
that its focus is on abstract historical forces rather than on real
people trying to solve real problems confronting society-thus,
he never directly examined the problems or the solutions to de-
termine their present relevance.
62
It is difficult for a nonhistorian to evaluate what remains of
the account of the birth of classical contract theory. Clearly, se-
rious questions have been raised. The more important questions
for this paper, however, concern Professor Gilmore's description
of the present-day reality of the reported demise of contract.
These criticisms center on Professor Gilmore's conclusion that
consideration based on bargained-for exchange died under the
onslaught of promissory estoppel and quasi-contract.
While there have been mild objections to Professor Gil-
more's description of the facts in the decline and fall of the the-
ory concerning the availability of contract defenses such as the
statute of frauds in promissory estoppel cases, 63 most of the crit-
icism has focused elsewhere. Specifically, objections have been
made to the conclusions drawn about the continuing vitality of
classical contract law. Accepting the existence of promissory
estoppel and quasi-contract as alternative bases for promissory
liability, Professor Speidel accurately stated the problem:
59. See Mooney, supra note 50, at 172 (citations omitted).
60. See Gordon, supra note 27, at 1232. Brody argues that the benefit-detriment
test was related to the commercial realities of the time, as was the refusal to evaluate
adequacy of consideration. Brody, supra note 3, at 838.
61. See Gordon, supra note 27, at 1233.
62. Gordley, supra note 50, at 454-57 (discussing the difficulties resulting from
Gilmore's "historicism").
63. See Milhollin, supra note 17, at 46-47 (arguing that the state of the law is un-
clear at this time).
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To put the matter more specifically, in the continuing transi-
tion [from grand theory to welfare state] what is left of the
ability of private citizens, through various forms of consent, to
protect themselves from civil liability or to order the future in
ways that will be supported in the courts?
84
Although Professor Gilmore does not answer this question, the
implication from his theory seems to be that very little will be
left of a private citizen's ability to order the future by agree-
ment. Because enforcement of promises will be based on reliance
or benefit conferred rather than on bargained-for exchange, con-
tract theory granting enforcement based on bargained-for ex-
change has died. Yet, that the "death" of contract has occurred
does not necessarily follow:
[I]t is difficult to see how the expansion of those doctrines sup-
ports an argument that the other side of contract theory-the
protection of the promisee's expectancy interest in his bar-
gain-was therefore weakened in any way or made to depend
upon some basis for recovery other than a promise.
65
Protection of this expectancy interest traditionally was
viewed as one of the primary purposes of contract law. 6 Classi-
cal contract theory performs two roles in giving this protection.
First, it provides a basis for enforcing promises given in ex-
change for other promises or actions, eliminating the need for
proof of reliance. This enforcement role encourages reliance by
eliminating the need to prove it-an important facilitation of
commercial dealings. 67 Second, the classical theory provides a
firm basis for planning transactions to achieve legal enforceabil-
ity. Such planning is less reliable when using only promissory
estoppel or quasi-contractual theories for enforcing promises. 8
Persuasive reasons have been advanced for using the bargained-
for exchange idea of consideration as the core notion for a the-
64. Speidel, supra note 49, at 1177-78. Milhollin argues that the process of making
private agreements remains the primary energizing force for commercial conduct in the
areas now subject to regulation outside traditional contract law. Milhollin, supra note 17,
at 49-60.
65. Milhollin, supra note 17, at 46.
66. See Strasser, Book Review, 9 IND. L. REv. 525, 532-34 (1976) (including citations
therein).
67. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damakes, 46 YAL. L.J.
52, 61-62 (1936).
68. See Strasser, supra note 66, at 535.
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ory promoting such planning and enforcement. 9 Without a clear
standard describing one group of promises that will almost al-
ways be enforced, contract law cannot perform these functions
and provide needed predictability.70 One need not entirely aban-
don the certainty provided by the classical theory to obtain the
increased flexibility of promissory estoppel and quasi-contract.
Although Professor Gilmore seems to have provided a useful
description of the change taking place, he may have overlooked
functions of the classical theory's consideration doctrine that
should give it continuing vitality.
Commentators have offered less criticism of Professor Gil-
more's argument that the second and third pillars of classical
contract theory have eroded. He can be mildly criticized for rely-
ing solely on noncommercial cases in discussing the decline of
the system's notions of absolute liability and limited remedies
that resulted in shifts from contract to tort."1 Several Uniform
Commercial Code provisions, however, also are cited as evi-
dence;72 presumably cases applying these could have been found
to provide examples of mainstream commercial disputes. Con-
cerning remedy expansion, recent cases granting punitive dam-
age recovery for contract claims perhaps are better viewed as
overtly describing and expanding"3 traditionally covert court
practices. Yet these observations are minor qualifications rather
than criticisms. The more central question is whether a showing
that liability is not absolute and remedies have expanded neces-
sarily erodes completely the core of the classical theory-
bargained-for exchange as consideration. This conclusion does
not appear to be warranted.
69. Professor Speidel lists four: (1) to channel conduct and to insure deliberation;
(2) to protect and to structure market transactions; (3) to support needed executory ex-
change while protecting idiosyncratic bargains; and (4) to permit development of reme-
dies that protect the expectation interest. Speidel, supra note 49, at 1170. Ellinghaus
stresses the ideas of reciprocity and exchange. Ellinghaus, supra note 6, at 274. To the
extent that any system of liability, contract, or tort uses bargained-for exchange as one
reason for enforcing promises that system will have the same difficulties in determining
when there has been an exchange as our present doctrine of consideration. See Gordley,
supra note 50, at 466-67. Where enforcement is also available on other bases, however,
the problem of determining when there has been an exchange will arise in fewer cases.
70. See Treitel, supra note 8, at 449. For a partial collection of current reform pro-
posals, see note 8 supra.
71. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 92-94.
72. See id. at 77 (citing U.C.C. §§ 2-205, 2-209).
73. See note 45 supra.
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A final criticism of The Death of Contract asks why the
classical theory has died and questions the explanations given.
While the growth of new bases for enforcing promises cannot be
denied, Professor Gilmore fails to explain adequately the com-
plete reversal portrayed; has the break been either so sharp or so
complete? There are serious problems in explaining the decline
of the classical theory primarily in terms of a shift from the lais-
sez faire market system to the twentieth century welfare state. 4
Professor Mooney has marshalled the scant empirical evidence
from the studies of Hurst, Macaulay, Friedman, and his own
work to suggest that little change occurred in contract theory in
the cases before and after Langdell and Holmes.7 5 This evidence
causes one to question whether creation of the classical theory
was as sharp a break as portrayed; perhaps its decline is also
proceeding less abruptly.
Despite some serious questions about his historical work,
Professor Gilmore persuades us that new theories have been de-
veloped and accepted to supplement and expand the traditional
reasons for enforcing promises. While breaking no new ground in
contract theory, such a description is useful and helps provide a
much needed context for discussion of the current state of doc-
trine. The conclusion that traditional contract theory is dead,
however, and the implicit finding that it has no role to play in
twentieth century life, are less persuasively established.
III. MACNEIL AND HIS FORERUNNERS
76
The works of Professor Ian Macneil and his forerunners
have a very different focus. While Professor Gilmore attempts to
explain what the courts are doing and why, these scholars take
as their starting point a study of the behavior of parties engag-
ing in commercial activity who may have a need for the legal
institution of contract. Their goal is to describe empirically this
world and its interrelationship with the legal system and then to
74. See Jones, The Jurisprudence of Contracts, 44 CN. L. REV. 43 (1975); text ac-
companying notes 51 & 52 supra.
75. Mooney, supra note 50, at 175. Gordon explains the survival: "Case law is among
other things the idealogy of mandarins." Gordon, supra note 27, at 1238.
76. See L. FRiEDMAN, supra note 16; J. HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE
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explore the implications of these findings about the nature and
utility of contract law.
7 7
A. Macneil's Forerunners-Hurst, Macaulay, and Friedman
The thesis of these scholars is that the present contract-law
system does not concern itself with problems that do in fact
arise frequently in the world of commercial contract makers and
that these commercial contract makers do not bring their
problems to the courts to be solved by the legal system.7 8 Sev-
eral reasons are given for this lack of congruence between the
system of contract law and contracting behavior. First, damage
awards are unrealistically low, making the potential payoff from
litigation not worth the cost.79 Thus, extra-legal sanctions such
as business ostracism have developed"0 and have assumed great
importance. Second, business parties make commercial deals for
the benefits to be gained and are relatively less interested in
planning for legal enforceability, legal sanctions, or indeed any
kind of legal relationship.8 1 Third, the real problems in commer-
cial relationships concern interpretation of what the agreement
meant in substance, while traditional doctrine maintains a mis-
placed emphasis on what was in fact said by the parties.8 2 This
situation is aggravated by the unitary and abstract nature of
traditional doctrine. The net result is that most disputes of com-
mercial significance are not decided in courts, and only one-shot
transactions or otherwise commercially aberrational matters are
brought there. 3 The empiricists conclude that the classical con-
77. Friedman & Macaulay, supra 24, at 808 (stating that their focus is on con-
tracting behavior). They conclude from their study:. "Its subject matter is the economic
order or the business world as it actually functions, and its method is empirical." Id.
78. See Macaulay, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures and the Complexities of
Contract, 11 LAw & Soc'y Rnv. 507, 508-10 (1977).
79. See Mueller, Contract Remedies: Business Fact and Legal Fantasy, 1967 Wis.
L. REv. 833, 834-36; Speidel, Contract Law: Some Reflections Upon Commercial Context
and the Judicial Process, 1967 Wis. L. Rav. 822, 824-26. Litigation is costly both in
direct expense, in disrupting business relationships, and in disruption of a party's inter-
nal operations by taking the time of management and other personneL
80. See Friedman & Macaulay, supra note 24, at 815.
81. See id. at 813-14; Macaulay, supra note 78, at 509.
82. See, e.g., Friedman & Macaulay, supra note 24, at 813; Reitz, supra note 50, at
700.
83. See Macaulay, supra note 77, at 512-15 (discussing four types of cases that will
be brought: (1) a plaintiff is so economically powerful that he need not worry about
defendant's reaction disrupting commercial relationships; (2) an economically powerful
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tract-law system is neither alive nor dead-it is simply irrele-
vant to the actual functioning of the commercial contracting sys-
tem it should serve and regulate. The significant disputes are
not brought to the courts; consequently intelligent policy mak-
ing through dispute resolution is not possible.
The first study to appear was Professor Willard Hurst's Law
and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Indus-
try in Wisconsin 1836-1915.8 The study is a legal, economic,
and social history of law and its interrelationship with one in-
dustry. Its framework is to focus on four general concepts of law
in society. Chapter IV, the first of two chapters dealing with the
general concept of contract, discusses the ways in which contract
law in the courts contributed to the organization of the market.85
Professor Hurst finds that court decisions and contract rules
helped create a market and it dispersed resource allocation and
production decisions by enforcing private agreements concerning
them. In addition, contract law expanded the size of the market.
Contract law encouraged a greater quantity of transactions
through decisions favoring business venture and bootstrap
financing so essential to growth of a new and capital-starved in-
dustry."6 Similarly, the law was flexible enough to provide for an
expanded scale of market operations, and significantly increased
business ventures, as these became economically necessary.8 7
Contract law also provided a useful, flexible system for contract
administration which solved disputes arising out of contract per-
formance, contract existence, and contract interpretation."8
Thus, Professor Hurst concludes, contract law in its general
and abstract form served the lumber industry well by giving it a
party desires to shift liability to an economically weaker one; (3) the commercial rela-
tionship is already shattered beyond repair and plaintiff is simply trying to salvage
whatever compensation he can; and (4) plaintiff attempts to collect debts as a bureau-
cratic function and to discipline individual trading partners. He concludes that:
"[Elconomically important contract cases that adjudicate rights are too rare to serve as a
solid foundation for the classical model." Id. at 515). See Friedman & Macaulay, supra
note 24, at 816-17; Gordon, supra note 27, at 1222-26.
84. J. HURST, LAW AND EcoNoMuc GRowTH: THE LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER IN-
DUSTRY IN WISCONSIN 1836-1915 (1964).
85. Id. at 289-343.
86. Id. at 297-321.
87. Id. at 321-33.
88. Id. at 337-42. The Wisconsin Legislature generally shared these market facilita-
tion goals and participated in policymaking designed to achieve them. Id. at 343-423.
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well-developed body of law to facilitate market growth. Unfortu-
nately, this same generality and stability made adjustments in
contract law more difficult as the industry matured and required
more individualized legal rules and standards.89 He also con-
cludes that, as public policy changed from its nineteenth century
unqualified support of private markets to substantial regulation
of industry in the twentieth, the initiative for articulating and
enforcing these new policy goals shifted from the courts to the
legislatures. 0 While the courts and their common law of con-
tract could promote the market mechanism as an efficient re-
source allocator, they could not establish and administer sub-
stantial public policies concerning conservation and land use
that an informed twentieth century public policy demanded.
Thus, contract law remained stable, but some of its subject mat-
ter was removed for separate treatment by the legislatures. 91
This view of contract law as a shrinking residuary, which
operates only when some other body of law does not, is echoed
in Professor Friedman's study.9 2 Again focusing on Wisconsin,
Professor Friedman studied the application and modification of
contract law generally during three periods: Period I from 1836
(when Wisconsin became a territory) until 1861; Period II from
1905 to 1907 and 1913 (the age of the progressives); and Period
III from 1955 to 1958 (the period of post-war economic boom
and the growth of metropolitan areas, big government, and mass
transport and communications). The study concludes that in
Period I the courts and their common law of contract were the
primary, creative determiners and initiators of market policy
through a generalized, abstract body of contract law of general
applicability. By Period I, however, their role had declined to
that of resolvers of particular, commercially marginal disputes
through primary emphasis on the unique facts of the case and
with reference to policies set largely by the legislature or admin-
istrative agencies.9 3
Friedman's conclusion rests on five specific findings. First,
the market support functions of contract law, so central to the
89. Id. at 294-98.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 343-44.
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decisionmaking of Period I, became almost irrelevant to deci-
sions of the particularistic, noncommercial cases of Period III. It
is difficult and unecessary to make commercial market policy in
noncommercial cases. Second, the court declined from a position
of great policymaking creativity and initiative in Period I to, by
Period III, a much more modest role of adjusting and applying
policies made primarily by others.9 Third, commercial parties
stopped bringing their commercially important disputes to the
courts; by Period IlI very few of their cases were based on signif-
icant market transactions, and most contracts cases were either
personal disagreements or "arose out of the .. . [commercial]
marginality of the litigants. 9 5 Thus, while judicial abstraction
and creativity in making policy was needed for the mainstream
commercial disputes brought to the courts and contract law in
the nineteenth century, the cases of the twentieth century re-
quired factual particularity and application of externally estab-
lished policies. Fourth, the courts and contract law gradually
lost the center stage to its rivals. While in Period I the courts
laid down general, abstract rules to govern market policy and
the legislatures provided narrow, fact-oriented exceptions, by
Period III the roles had been reversed.9 6 Finally, the style and
technique of judicial opinions reflected the new perception that
most social problems demanded more affirmative policy state-
ments and conscious management than a court could give them.
Generalized contract law was increasingly replaced by affirma-
tive regulation.97 Professor Friedman finds a continuing role for
the courts and traditional contract law, but only in the handling
of particular, commercially marginal disputes.98
Professor Macaulay's study confirms this view in his conclu-
sion that most business parties do not resort either to the courts
or to contract law for resolution of most commercially significant
disputes.9 9 His work focuses on the perceptions and attitudes of
business parties rather than on the work of the courts. He con-
94. Id. at 184-98.
95. Id. at 198-202.
96. Id. at 202-10.
97. Id. at 210-15.
98. See id. at 215. He also finds that the courts have developed a new role in pro-
tecting the rights of individuals against power-wielding institutions, public and private,
of the twentieth century mass society. See id. at 209.
99. See Macaulay, supra note 15.
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cludes that business parties typically do not plan for legal en-
forceability when negotiating commercial transactions; that dis-
putes are typically resolved with reference to a generalized,
commercial, good-faith standard, rather than with reference to
contract law; and that courts are rarely used to resolve commer-
cially' significant disputes.10
Yet these empiricists are uncertain about the policy impli-
cations of their conclusions. Professors Friedman and Macaulay
argue that the law school contracts courses are outmoded and
should be changed. 10 1 In a more recent comparative study, how-
ever, Professor Macaulay speculates: "[iut is questionable
whether capitalist, socialist, or mixed economic systems would
benefit if more disputes were resolved by the application of offi-
cially sanctioned contract norms."102 Professor Macneil's theo-
ries can be approached as an attempt to suggest how the present
system of contract law can be adapted to reach most commercial
exchange behavior.
B. Macneil's Relational Theory
Against this background of empirical research, Professor Ian
Macnefl has developed a theory of regulating all exchange be-
havior by contract. He begins by defining contract to cover all
economic exchange relations, not just exchange based on agree-
ments. Contract, then, is the device used to project exchange
into the future.103 This definition encompasses exchange based
on agreement, but extends beyond it in ways that are critical to
100. Id. at note 24.
101. See L. FRIEDMAN, Preface to CoNTRAcT LAW IN AMERCA (1965); Friedman &
Macaulay, supra note 24.
102. Macaulay concludes that some slack, sloppiness, and irrationality in the con-
tract making and enforcement system may be the price we pay for business flexibility
necessary for growth. Macaulay, supra note 77, at 524-25.
103. Macneil, supra note 2, at 694-96, 712, 733-34. See generally Macneil, A Primer
of Contract Planning, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 627 (1975); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of
Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical and Relational Contract
Law, 72 Nw. L. REv. 854 (1978); Macneil, Restatement (Second) of Contracts and
Presentiation, 60 VA. L. Rnv. 589 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Presentiation]; Macneil,
Whither Contracts?, 21 J. LEGAL EDuc. 403 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Whither Con-
tracts?]. For a more traditional case analysis, see Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed
Remedies, 47 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1962). For a collection of introductory and explana-
tory essays from his casebook, see Macneil, Essays on the Nature of Contract, 10 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 159 (1979).
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his thesis. These ways will be explored after a review of Profes-
sor Macneil's view of traditional contract doctrine.
Traditional contract doctrine, he argues, is based on the
idea of presentiation: "Presentiation is thus a recognition that
the course of the future is bound by present events and that by
those events the future has for many purposes been brought ef-
fectively into the present."' Traditional doctrine attempts to
permit parties to presentiate-to control the future by bringing
it into the present and to plan for it through bargained-for ex-
change. Its goal is to govern completely all aspects of the ex-
change.10 5 To reach this goal, it assumes that exchange takes
place in discrete transactions which are individualized and un-
connected to other discrete transactions.10'8 This assumption is,
for Macneil, a critical characteristic of our traditional contract-
law system.
In the classical system, presentiation is accomplished by en-
forcing bargained-for exchange based on the mutual assent of
the parties.07 Parties can be required to do certain things in the
future because they agreed to them in an exchange. When this
assent had not gone far enough and did not reach aspects of the
exchange then in dispute, courts extended it with a finding of
assent which was implicit or wholly fictitious:
As much as possible of the content of the relation, both struc-
ture and detail, is forced into a pattern of mutual assent ex-
pressed at some simultaneous point of time; content necessary
to achieve -presentiation but which cannot sensibly be rational-
ized into a pattern of instantaneous mutual assent, will be sup-
plied eo instante by the legal system in a form as precisely
predictable as possible.10 8
Professor Macneil argues that parties to an exchange wish
to control the future; in the traditional system, presentiation by
bargained-for exchange was the means to accomplish this.109
104. Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 103, at 589.
105. See Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 103, at 592; Macneil, supra note 2, at
693.
106. See Macneil, supra note 2, at 693.
107. See Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 103, at 592-95; Macneil, Whither Con-
tracts?, supra note 103, at 403-06.
108. Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 103, at 593-94.
109. Id. at 595; Macneil, Whither Contracts?, supra note 103, at 406.
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Presentiation is most effective in controlling discrete transac-
tions in the future, and, in such a system, assent expressed
through promise is one good means to accomplish presentia-
tion.110 This proposition is true because at one point in time it is
possible to come close to complete, mutual planning. The key
here, however, is limiting presentiation to discrete transactions.
Discrete transactions are those in which "the socioeconomic
structures leading to them are congenial with strong individual-
ism."'" To illustrate, Professor Macneil analogizes a discrete
transaction to a service station stop for gasoline. 2 Economic ex-
change is virtually the only motive for the transaction, and the
relationship touches only economic exchange aspects of the par-
ties' identities and relations. Communication is limited to as-
pects of the exchange. The only personal satisfactions involved
are economic ones related to exchange. Although not expressly
identified, the lack of a relationship between this transaction
and any previous or possible later ones clearly seems to be an
implied characteristic. Thus, discrete transactions are one-shot
deals in which the parties' motives, actions, and satisfactions are
exclusively economic and exchange related. He calls these dis-
crete transactions "transactional exchanges."
These transactional exchanges can be contrasted with rela-
tional exchanges, in Professor Macneil's vocabulary. Just as
transactional exchanges result from discrete transactions, rela-
tional exchanges result from a continuing exchange relationship
between two parties. (The distinction is sometimes articulated
as one between contract transactions and contract relations.)
Contract transactions (transactional exchanges) were analogized
to a service station stop for gasoline; contract relations (rela-
tional exchanges) are analogized to a traditional marriage (in the
exchange sense).113 Thus, contract relations have the characteris-
tics of whole-person relations which include more than economic
motives, deep and extensive communication, and significant ele-
ments of noneconomic personal involvement and satisfaction. As
110. See Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 103, at 595; Macneil, supra note 2, at
712.
111. Macneil, supra note 2, at 743.
112. Id. at 720-23. He notes the analogy to the distinction by sociologists between
primary and secondary relations. Id.
113. See id. at 720 n.85. Cf. Macneil, supra note 103, at 596.
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this distinction has developed, the focus has changed from
purely transactional or relational exchanges to identification of
transactional and relational characteristics, respectively, of all
exchanges.11'
Professor Macneil's theory is built around this distinction.
Because there are relational exchanges and relational character-
istics of all exchanges, contract law and doctrine should recog-
nize and regulate these, instead of simply assuming that all
exchange takes place in discrete, transactional contracts or con-
tracts with essentially transactional characteristics. Based upon
the empirical studies discussed above, as well as his own obser-
vations, Professor Macneil concludes that the kinds of behavior
regulated by traditional contract law, and the kinds of behav-
ioral assumptions made about contracting parties, do not ex-
haust the kinds of behavior actually exhibited by parties in ex-
changes.1 15 Since he has defined contract to encompass all
exchange, presumably contract law should govern relational
behavior as well as transactional behavior.1
The need to govern relational exchange behavior in addition
to transactional exchange behavior is heightened when one real-
izes that there are some relational characteristics in all ex-
changes. Transactional exchange behavior is used to project ex-
change into the future and to control it; Professor Macneil
argues that the nature of promise making and exchanging, with
its inherent ambiguities, means that an exchange of promises
cannot be the complete basis for dealing with the future. The
commercial relations of the parties will, or may, fill this gap.117
Exchange may be projected into the future by the relations of
the parties, as well as by their agreements, and "[t]he depen-
dence, the motivation, and inevitably, the obligations arising
from such relations may affect future exchange just as rigorously
as any promise."1 18 Since virtually every exchange will have
114. See Macneil, supra note 2, at 738-40. He uses two axes, transactional and
relational.
115. Id. at 694-95.
116. See id. at 805-15. For a discussion of the difficulty in using transactional rules
to regulate relational behavior, see Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 103, at 597-609.
117. See Macneil, supra note 2, at 726.
118. Id. at 719. For illustrations of primarily relational exchanges, see Macneil,
Presentiation, supra note 103, at 597. Accord, Speidel, supra note 49, at 1174; Reitz,
supra note 50, at 700. Brody views contract as a social act. Brody, supra note 3, at 797-
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some transactional characteristics and some relational character-
istics, contract law should consider both explicitly.
Present contract law is inadequate to deal with the rela-
tional characteristics of exchange because it is premised on the
notion that exchange is a purely transactional phenomenon with
the sole purpose of promoting presentiation as a means of con-
trolling the future. Yet, relational exchange seeks to control the
future, not by specifically planning for it, but by creating and
maintaining a commercial relationship that will be sufficiently
sturdy to accomplish future exchange. "As one moves towards
the relational end of this spectrum, presentiation plays a rela-
tively smaller role, since [an] increasing [number of] aspects of
the relation must be left to future determination."11 9 In The
Many Futures of Contracts,20 Professor Macneil spends over
half the article showing how specific aspects of exchange, affect-
ing most of its substance, vary as the relational characteristics of
the exchange vary.1 21 The aspects of exchange affected by its re-
lational characteristics include crucial matters of the substance
of the exchange: (1) measurability and measurement of ex-
change; (2) sources of socioeconomic support; (3) duration; (4)
commencement and termination; (5) planning, including focus,
specificity, sources and forms, "bindingness," and conflicts of
interest; (6) future cooperation-postcommencement planning
and performance; (7) incidence of benefits and burdens; (8) obli-
gations undertaken; (9) number of participants; and (10) partici-
pant views of the exchange. 22 Because these affected aspects are
so central to the substance of exchange, Macneil argues that it is
the proper function of law to govern the relational aspects of the
transaction and to do so with rules expressly designed to govern
contract relations. 23 Failure to do so means that, in some in-
98.
119. Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 103, at 596. Although not consciously
acknowledging Macneil, Dugdale & Lowe, presumably are discussing the kind of rule
Professor Macneil advocates. Dugdale & Lowe, Contracts to Contract and Contracts to
Negotiate, 10 J. Bus. L. 28 (1976).
120. Macneil, supra note 2.
121. Id. at 744-805.
122. Id.
123. Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 103, at 608-09; Macneil, supra note 2, at
744-805. Reitz notes that most contract disputes concern interpretation of terms and
that traditional contract doctrine provides for these disputes only tools which are "blunt
and clumsy." Reitz, supra note 50, at 700.
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stances, the relational characteristics of exchange are not
reached by contract law at all, and in other instances the rela-
tional characteristics are governed by the misuse of rules
designed for a transactional setting.12 In addition, doctrinal
confusion is introduced into our essentially transaction-based
system by the existence of some specific rules which are appar-
ently relational. 12 5
Professor Macneil concludes by identifying five basic norms,
which are common to all law governing exchange behavior:126 (1)
reciprocity; (2) effectuation of the parties' roles; (3) limited free-
dom of exercise of the right of choice; (4) effectuation of plan-
ning; and (5) harmonization of contracts (exchange) with their
internal and external social matrices. Using these norms, a sys-
tem or systems of rules should be constructed to govern contract
transactions and contract relations. Such an approach would
have four virtues. First, it would supplemefit traditional contract
doctrine by providing relational rules for relational cases and
terminate the present misuse of transactional rules. For exam-
ple, the attempt to place what was traditionally known as a uni-
lateral contract in a transactional setting forces definition of the
rights and duties of the parties at the time of "agreement"
rather than with reference to their future relational expecta-
tions. Second, it would serve as a basis for the reunification of
contract law, recombining the central features of whole systems
of exchange regulating law, such as corporations or labor law,
which have spun off. Third, it would relieve traditional contract
doctrine of the pressure of coping with situations for which it
was never designed. Finally, recognition of the basic norms and
relational aspects of contracts would result in more realistic
analyses of the concept of consent and its limitations, in both
relational and transactional cases.
1 27
In sum, Professor Macneil argues that relational behavior is
important to exchanges and that our contract law should take
124. Macneil discusses the problem in connection with specific sections of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts. Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 103, at 597-609.
125. Id. at 603-08. In the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, specific problems
arise in Chapter 9 concerning the scope of contract relations and in Chapter 10 concern-
ing performance and nonperformance.
126. This list is a shortened paraphrase of Macneil. Macneil, supra note 2, at 805-
15.
127. See Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 103, at 601-03.
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cognizance of this fact. While it is difficult to disagree with this
conclusion, one can disagree with the legal structure Macneil has
erected upon it. The critical question is not whether exchange
relationships exist nor whether they have an effect on the sub-
stance of exchange. It is whether a body of law based on assent
to specific exchanges-exchanges which have been deliberately
bargained for with a reciprocal assent as the condition (the body
of law labeled contracts)-should be expanded to cover ex-
changes that do not have this characteristic.
Professor Harry Jones has argued recently that the tradi-
tionally expressed idea of contract is an idea of compelling emo-
tional force which has attained the status of a social institu-
tion.12 Noting origins in the compact between the Children of
Israel and Jehova and the frequently expressed contractual basis
of political obligation, he observes:
To most people, at all stages of history, there is a certain self-
evident rightness about pacta sunt servanda, the moral imper-
ative that obligations freely agreed to are to be honored and
performed.
1"9
Contract, somehow, is a compelling and durable idea in the
mind, perhaps even in the subconscious, of mankind."10
In response to the observation that society's triumphal march
from status to contract may have stopped and retreated, Profes-
sor Jones argues that areas of decision formerly controlled by
superior economic power, through agreements, are not being di-
rectly regulated and that the incidence of truly bargained con-
tracts has not declined.13 1 While this idea of contract may not be
coterminous with the precise concept in our contract law, the
core of deliberate agreement to specific exchange seems to be the
same. Certainly more directed activity than entry into a rela-
tionship is envisioned. Thus, one must question whether the law
of contract is an appropriate place to regulate activity which, in
the traditional and emotionally powerful sense, is not con-
tracting. It is also questionable whether an extension to cover
merely "relational" behavior is appropriate given our prevailing
128. Jones, supra note 74, at 44-50.
129. Id. at 44.
130. Id. at 47.
131. Id. at 49-50.
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social and economic ideals of limited government and, if so, is
appropriately labeled contract. Ultimately this question must be
answered by an examination of the role determined to be appro-
priate for law in the area of exchange behavior.
IV. GILMORE AND MACNEIL-JURISPRUDENTIAL AsSUMPTIONS
AND SomE FUTHER QT E SsS
Professors Gilmore and Macneil agree on the existence of
inadequacies in our present contract law-Gilmore because it is
dead and no longer used by the courts to decide cases and Mac-
neil because it does not cover large areas of human conduct and
motivation which are involved in exchanges and which can dra-
matically affect the substance of exchange. Thus, one is tempted
to conclude that they are articulating different aspects of the
"graveyard theory" of contract and should be read as essentially
consistent and supplementary. It is the thesis of this Article,
however, that such a temptation should be resisted; these two
writers are pursuing different goals. First, the authors' defini-
tions, of the proper scope of contract law in governing some or all
exchange behavior is different, and, second, they appear to differ
in their views of the purpose for contract law in society. Profes-
sor Gilmore does not articulate a wish for the scope of tradi-
tional contract law to be expanded substantially to reach addi-
tional kinds of exchange behavior; Professor Macneil, however,
does wish to expand the scope of contract law to reach relational
as well as transactional exchange behavior. In addition, Gilmore
proceeds from the premise that the purpose of contract law is
primarily to resolve disputes rather than to regulate affirma-
tively. As discussed below, Macneil is unclear about the ultimate
purpose of contract law. Thus, despite their agreement that
there are inadequacies in traditional contract doctrine, they
would likely not agree on either the causes or the remedies for
these inadequacies.
A. Gilmore's Traditional Scope and Purpose of Contract
Law
Traditional contract law does not apply to all promises; its
scope is limited to promises about specific future transactions
given in exchange for other promises or actions. It does express a
number of specific policies in terms of the characteristics that
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either the promises or the exchange must have,132 but it comes
into play only with promises about future transactions. Profes-
sor Gilmore tells us that this scope may include promises about
future transactions when there is no bargained-for exchange, but
there is either reliance (promissory estoppel) or benefit con-
ferred (quasi-contract). He does not appear to question the lim-
ited application of contract law to promises about specific ex-
changes. Although he has not done so, he might have noted that
a number of specialized bodies of law have been created to deal
with continuing exchange relationships when a need for such
specialized coverage and more affirmative regulation has been
perceived.1 3 3 In these instances, however, a specific need for ex-
panded regulation and scope of coverage has been identified,
typically by legislatures. The change is in the form of an excep-
tion to the traditional system. In addition, more direct sanctions
than simple nonenforcement of contracts typically are required
to accomplish this affirmative regulation.134 To the extent that
the traditional system, as modified by Professor Gilmore's
description, survives, the traditional limitations regarding the
scope of application of its rules should also survive. As Professor
Jones has argued, contract is ultimately a constitutional device
articulating the circumstances in which parties may exercise
contract's private law creating power.135 Specifically, parties may
use contract to create private law for their transactions; this pri-
vate law will be publicly enforced only if the parties make
promises about specific future exchanges. Professor Gilmore
does not appear to disagree with this traditional prerequisite to
the exercise of the private lawmaking power contract confers.
Further, The Death of Contract should be evaluated ac-
cording to its author's view of the function of private law in the
courts. Professor Gilmore has argued recently that lawyers
132. For example, the Statute of Frauds prescribes how certain promises must be
expressed, and rules concerning duress articulate a basic policy that the exchange must
not be forced on one party by another.
133. See Milhollin, supra note 17, at 50-51. Labor law and corporation law are two
examples of such separate bodies of law. Hurst and Friedman discuss the spinning-off
process as part of the reason for the "decline" of contract law. See text accompanying
notes 81-91 supra. -
134. See text accompanying notes 140-42, 146 infra (discussing the sanction of
nonenforcement).
135. Jones, supra note 78, at 50-53.
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should guard against any all-purpose, theoretical solutions for
our society's problems:
As lawyers we will do well to be on our guard against any
suggestions that through [private] law, our society can be re-
formed, purified, or saved. The function of [private] law, in a
society like our own, is altogether more modest and less apoca-
lyptic. It is to provide a mechanism for the settlement of dis-
putes in the light of broadly conceived principles on whose
soundness, it must be assumed, there is a general consensus
among us.1386
(Presumably, Professor Gilmore intends this statement to apply
only to private law as applied by the courts, in view of the fact
that this statement is made in the context of discussing roles
and functions of individual lawyers.) This mechanism for dis-
pute settlement will permit gradual adjustment to the change
which is inevitable in any society. And, within this function of
private law, "[t]he function of the lawyer is to preserve a skepti-
cal relativism in a society hell-bent for absolutes. ' 13 7 Private law
in the courts will, in this view, reflect the values and norms of a
society more than it will determine them; its function is to re-
solve disputes.
In keeping with dispute resolution as the function of private
law, The Death of Contract is aimed at describing how contract-
type disputes are in fact being resolved.138 It accurately adds to
conventional knowledge the observations that traditional con-
tract theory is no longer exclusive because other bases for en-
forcement of promises are now being used by courts, that new
and expanded excuses for nonperformance are now being ac-
cepted, and that greater and different remedies for failure to
perform promises are being granted.13 9 Presumably, if he were
persuaded that his description omitted part of the existing and
needed theory, as argued elsewhere in this Article, Professor Gil-
more would amend the description to that extent. But the focus
136. G. GnLMoRE, supra note 55, at 109 (emphasis added). He goes on to refer to law
as an "unstable mass in a precarious equilibrium." Id. at 110. However, disputes must be
resolved with reference to some criteria and the ultimate goals of a body of law will be
reflected in these criteria. See Section IV.B, infra.
137. Id. at 110.
138. G. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 3-4.
139. See generally Milhollin, supra note 17, at 29-30; note 45, supra.
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of inquiry would continue to be on dispute resolution. Professor
Gilmore shares this focus with traditional contract law:
"[C]ontract law has no direct application to the transaction until
a dispute arises that is not settled by agreement and the ag-
grieved party petitions a court for redress. 140
B. Goals of Dispute Resolution Through Conventional
Contract Law
If dispute resolution, rather than affirmative social regula-
tion, is the purpose of conventional contract law, the inquiry
must then turn to the goals of such dispute resolution. By what
criteria are disputes between contracting parties to be resolved
and in pursuit of what social ends? Of course, the fact that dis-
putes are resolved by courts with regular procedures, rather than
through trial by combat, blood feud, or law of the jungle, is a
means of positive, elementary social ordering; rational non-
violent resolution is itself a social end. Contract law, however, is
pursuing far more refined social goals in its resolution of
disputes.
This section will review the conventionally articulated goals
of traditional contract law and provide an arguable support for
each. (In preparing the Article, the author expected to find a
complete and coherent literature on this topic. However, re-
search has disclosed only the few sources cited that address the
problem in greater depth than casebook introductions.) The cov-
erage here is not intended primarily as new doctrinal develop-
ment, but as a coherent statement of the conventional wisdom
and a plausible justification and rationalization. This section is
intended to serve as a reference point for the following section's
discussion of Macneil's potential impact on these conventional
goals.
The conventional goals of contract law can be grouped into
four general categories. First, contract law seeks to support pri-
vate markets. Typically, this goal is pursued by ordering pay-
ment of compensatory damages as a surrogate for specifically en-
forcing the promise, although specific enforcement is being
ordered more frequently. Second, contract law attempts to regu-
140. Speidel, supra note 76, at 822. See, e.g., H. HAVIGHURST, THE NATURE OF
PRIVATE CONTRACT 83-84 (1961).
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late certain conduct in the bargaining process. Third, it seeks
limited advancement of some fundamental social policies by de-
nying enforcement to certain contracts or the contracts of cer-
tain parties. Fourth, it seeks to establish limits on the use of
contract for the exercise of social, political, or economic power
by certain powerful entities. Pursuit of each of these last three
goals serves to limit pursuit of the goal of supporting private
markets. Yet these limitations must themselves be kept within
bounds if the primary goal is to be attained. In this respect, a
critical feature of contract law's pursuit of these three goals is its
use of the nonenforcement sanction for specific contracts only.
This limitation is a useful one for contract law, but it does re-
strict the kinds of social policy that contract can effectively
support.
Conventionally, one of the major goals of contract law is the
support of private markets.14 This preference for private mar-
ket activity has two justifications. First, it is justified by political
and social norms of limited government and relatively un-
restricted individual freedom of activity. "[T]he balance of
power essential to a democratically organized society cannot be
maintained without a considerable measure of freedom in the
economic sphere as well as in others. 1 4 2 Second, private market
activity is thought to be the best way to organize most of the
society's economic activity to achieve the best allocation and
most efficient use of resources in supplying material needs and
wants. Exceptions have been made to slavish devotion to these
political and social ideals, and to economic efficiency, when there
have been good reasons to do so. For example, labor relations
and the sale of corporate securities are subject to substantial
141. See, e.g., J. HURST, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 231
(1977); Kessler & Sharp, Contract as a Principle of Order, reprinted in R. SCHWARTS &
J. SKOLNICK, SOCIETY AND THE REGAL ORDER 155 (1970). Macneil describes contract as
the "primary economic building block of the modern capitalist society." Macneil, Essays
on the Nature of Contract, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 159, 198 (1979). The concern expressed
below is that his theories of contract law may not adequately shape and cement these
blocks.
142. H. HAVIGHURST, supra note 140, at 98-99. See also J. HURST, supra note 141, at
266. For a summary of conventional justifications for this individualism ideal, see Ken-
nedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1685, 1713-17
(1976). But see P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANT=RUST LAW 22-23 (1978) (questioning the
connection between political democracy and economic decentralization). This justifica-
tion, however, is broader than simple economic decentralization.
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regulation, in one case to regulate in pursuit of industrial peace
and to improve the lot of the wage earner, and in the other to
prevent fraud and improper advantage-taking. Yet, these excep-
tions are contrary to the general premises.143
There are two necessary conditions for the existence and
operation of private markets. First, pursuit of private initiative
must be permitted. Second, proper exercise of this private initia-
tive must be rewarded with private profits, and improper exer-
cise must be punished by private losses. In view of the govern-
ment regulation of many economic entities and operations in our
society, it may be argued that private markets no longer exist.
While it is true that completely private markets, subject to no
public scrutiny, are rare, private initiative and private profits
and losses do continue to be the primary allocators of goods and
services in the present economic system in the United States. In
this sense, we have private markets that need the support of
contract law.
Further, the individualistic ideals and precise formal rules
of conventional contract law make it a good vehicle to provide
such protection. Such ideals and rules promote private transac-
tions and are, within the context of general state involvement,
relatively non-interventionist. 144 In addition, they comport with
the values of self-reliance and private acceptance of the conse-
quences of private action.145 The primary sanction that conven-
tional contract law imposes in support of private markets is an
143. The legal arguments that justify an ideal are not independent from the politi-
cal, moral, and economic ones. See Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1722. For a short discus-
sion of why a group of ideas becomes the prevailing ideology, see G. WHITE, PATTERNS OF
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 133-35 (1978).
For a short discussion of the idea that contract law is to be treated as a residuary,
and other bodies of law are spun off from it as more affirmative regulation and sanction
are needed, see Milhollin, supra note 17, at 50-51.
The common law, particularly the early common law, was not always favorably dis-
posed toward individualism supported by public enforcement of private contract. See
generally G. WHITE, supra at 19-24.
144. See Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1740-51. A system of affirmative regulation of
some particular economic activity assumes some exercise of private initiative. For exam-
ple, if private parties did not wish to enter into securities transactions, there would be no
market on which securities regulation could operate. But the system of regulation must
direct and limit the exercise of private initiative if it is to achieve its affirmative regula-
tory goal. Contract law should be wary of this direction and limitation if it is to support
the operation of private markets.
145. Id. at 1737-40.
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award of compensatory damages.146 In sum, the precise formal
rules and individualistic ideals of contract law are considered to
support private markets by stimulating private activity, re-
warding proper private initiative and punishing improper initia-
tive, and reducing the legal uncertainty that faces bargaining
parties. As long as this society's economic system depends pri-
marily on private initiative for allocation of most goods and ser-
vices, any substantial change in this fundamental legal support
should be carefully considered.
Yet, it can be argued that contract law does not serve as an
essential support to private markets because most contracting
parties do not plan transactions or resolve disputes with refer-
ence to that law. 147 As discussed above, some contracting parties
do plan transactions and resolve disputes with reference to con-
tract law; it is important to preserve this safe harbor for those
who choose to use it. Further, contract law has been considered
as a partial, indirect moral guide to contracting parties and to
society generally.148 To the extent that it supports private mar-
kets, it is one implicit legitimizing force for those markets. Fi-
nally, contract law must provide criteria for resolution of the
commercially atypical dispute that will find its way to the law. If
market support criteria are not used to resolve this kind of dis-
pute, there is potential for destabilization of markets beyond the
realm of present dispute resolution.
The goal of supporting private markets, however, should not
be all pervasive nor unqualified. When the reasons for support-
ing private markets do not apply, pursuit of additional, and even
potentially conflicting, goals will be necessary. Support of pri-
vate markets and their theoretically efficient results assumes a
given distribution of wealth in the society. If one of the social
goals being pursued is alteration of the distribution of wealth in
a more egalitarian direction, support of private markets may be
relatively less important.149 In theory, private markets give eco-
146. Id. at 1743. See note 4 supra. Recent commentators have noted the tendency to
award punitive damages in cases of extreme breach of contract. For contract law to pur-
sue its market support function most effectively, limits on the cases granting such
awards need to be articulated.
147. This conclusion rests on the empirical work discussed in Section IIB. supra.
148. See, e.g., Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 FLA. L.
Rav. 367 (1957).
149. See C. JACOBS, LAw WRITES AND THE COURTS 93-97 (1954); J. HURST, supra
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nomically efficient results when all parties exchanging in them
have perfect knowledge, rationality, and foresight. When these
conditions are not approximated, efficiency may not result from
private markets, and goals other than market support should
again assume relatively more importance.150 Finally, the other
goals of contract law serve to limit the power that contract law
permits contracting parties to exercise. 151
The second major goal of contract law is to discourage cer-
tain bargaining process conduct by denying enforcement to the
resulting agreements. It seems plausible that some restrictions
on the pursuit of purely short-term self-interest in the bargain-
ing process will be necessary to make the process work.152 Thus,
agreements based upon fraud, misrepresentation, overreaching,
and similar improper bargaining conduct are not enforced. Tra-
ditionally, this policing of the bargaining process has remained
within the broad framework of reasonably precise formal rules
found in other parts of contract law. More recently, the policing
has taken the form of affirmatively protecting broad classes of
contracting parties, such as the poor or consumers. As will be
discussed below, such policing must be subject to limits or it can
lead naturally into the kind of affirmative regulation, with more
note 141, at 266; Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1762. For a treatment of the idea that
contract law may not be a good vehicle for such redistribution, see Kronman, Contract
Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
150. Kennedy, supra note 136, at 1753 (discussing goals other than market support
goals generally).
Economics has termed this situation "market failure." Market failure results when,
for some reason, a market for a scarce economic good either will not exist or, if it does
exist, will not give efficient results. See generally Arrow, The Organization of Economic
Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market v. Nonmarket Allocation, in ANALY-
SIS AND EVALUATION OF PUBLIC EXPENDrrUIRS; THE PPB SYSTEM, 47-64 (Joint Economic
Committee 1966); Williamson, The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure
Considerations, 61 AM. EcoN. REV. 112 (1971). Market failure is frequently treated as a
problem of imperfect information. For a perceptive recent discussion of market failure as
a claimed justification for government intervention, see Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening
in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127
PA. L. REV. 630 (1979).
151. Holmes develops the idea that good faith, expanded liability, and more flexible
remedies do not signal the death of classical contract, only its limitations. Holmes, supra
note 45. See notes 154-56, infra.
152. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1713. It can be argued that these restric-
tions promote economic efficiency by making exchange more likely to be value maximiz-




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol32/iss3/4
CONTRACT'S "MANY FUTURES"
affirmative sanctions, that contract law is ill-equipped to pro-
vide153 and that may conflict with the market support goals.
The third major goal of contract law also has potential
points of conflict with the first. Contract law attempts to provide
limited advancement to certain social results considered to be
good; it does so by denying enforcement to some contracts.
These rules break down into two groups. First, enforcement may
be denied because the type of contract is against public pol-
icy-contracts to commit a crime and contracts to pay gambling
debts in most states are good examples. Second, enforcement is
sometimes denied the contracts of certain groups of contractors;
the groups are typically well defined within narrow limits by
either their probable small size (incompetents) or an easily
ascertainable characteristic (age). For each group, the primary
sanction available is typically nonenforcement, although com-
pensation for partial performance is also available frequently.
While this goal is potentially in conflict with the goal of protec-
tion of private markets, the limited and reasonably well-defined
contracts and groups to which it applies will minimize the num-
ber of situations of actual conflict.
The fourth major objective has a potentially greater conflict
with the support of private market goals. Contract law fre-
quently and increasingly limits the use of contract to exercise
social, political, or economic power against certain broad catego-
ries of contracting parties. This limitation is designed to redis-
tribute wealth from powerful entities to protected groups. The
groups protected under this goal are typically large, diverse, and
open-ended. For example, unconscionability is used to protect
the poor and the consumer;"" Federal Trade Commission rules
have been proposed to protect used car buyers '55 and all buyers
of consumer products.15' When conventional contract law is the
153. For a discussion of the general contradiction between individualistic and altru-
istic ideals, see Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1731-35.
154. U.C.C. § 2-302. Kessler & Sharp, supra note 135 (discussing the potential con-
flict in contract law rules).
155. For a brief discussion of the proposed Federal Trade Commission rules to pro-
tect used car buyers, see [1978] ANrTRusT & TRADE REG. RaP. (BNA) 867, § A-1.
156. See generally Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provements Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. 1979), and rules adopted thereunder.
Macneil develops the idea of limits to the exercise of power through contract. Macneil,
Essays on the Nature of Contract, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 159, 192-200 (1979).
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vehicle, broad standards are typically used; they are then given
specific meaning only in the context of the particular facts of the
dispute. 157 In this situation, there is typically a sense of the lim-
its of applicability of the standards, even if the limits are unex-
pressed.158 Without such limits, private markets would be less
likely to respond to the needs and desires of the protected
groups. When more affirmative regulation, with more affirmative
sanctions than mere compensatory damages or nonenforcement,
is desired, it is usually necessary to create a body of detailed
rules with explicit, more affirmative sanctions.159 Yet, the use of
a more active sanction will tend to discourage private initiative
and undercut the contract law support for private markets.
Thus, it is fortunate that most of this protection has come in the
form of spinning off new bodies of law, rather than rewriting all
of conventional contract law. When the redistribution and pro-
tection is undertaken by modifying traditional contract law, the
limits of such modification need to be established, either overtly
or covertly, to limit the conflict with private market support.160
Pursuit of this goal need not entirely conflict with the con-
tract law goal of supporting private markets. When such support
is not justified because the necessary preconditions for socially
beneficial operation of private markets are not met,161 the con-
flict of goals is more apparent than real. This protection is pro-
vided under the banner of limiting the exercise of power through
contract; a real cost of such protection is restriction of the ten-
157. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-302: This section authorizes the court to deny enforcement to
"unconscionable" contracts and "unconscionable" contract terms.
Kennedy argues that use of more generalized standards as the form of substantive
law rule is more likely where altruistic goals support the rule. Kennedy, supra note 142,
at 1766.76.
158. See, e.g., Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Douglas Aircraft Co., 238 Cal. App. 2d 95, 47
Cal. Rptr. 518 (1965) (refusing to find unconscionable limitation of liability in a contract
between two large commercial entities when the limitation had been a subject of genuine
bargaining between the parties).
159. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681t (1974 & Supp. 1979);
Uniform Consumer Credit Code; various regulations dealing with consumer product
safety.
160. Holmes does not discuss the problems of limits in this context, but he is most
concerned with establishing that extra-contract damages should be awarded in first-
party insurance cases only on the basis of the insurer's unreasonable conduct and not on
a strict liability theory. Holmes, supra note 45, at 377-81.
161. See note 144 supra. For a discussion of the behavior of markets characterized
by imperfect information, see Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 150, at 640-50.
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dency of private markets to respond to the market-expressed
preferences of the protected group.162 These costs should be
evaluated appropriately in establishing protection. Certainly, the
process of dynamic adjustment in pursuit of these conflicting
and desirable goals is one of the major challenges facing contem-
porary contract law.
In summary, although conventional contract law is pursuing
potentially conflicting goals, the conflict should prove manage-
able. The goal of protecting and facilitating the operation of pri-
vate markets is paramount. Other goals, focusing on more distri-
butional concerns, typically are pursued only to a limited extent
by contract law. This pursuit of other goals establishes limits for
the market support goal."-' Further, the limitations tend to re-
strict pursuit of these other goals to contract situations in which
the justifications for unqualified support of private markets are
less compelling-such as consumer cases and cases involving
sales to poor people. When greater regulation with more affirma-
tive sanctions is sought, the general tendency has been and
should be to spin off the area into a new body of law, rather
than undercut the main body and thrust of market-support-
oriented contract law.""
162. Professor Leff has argued persuasively that such protection can in fact legally
debilitate or incapacitate the protected group:
One can see it enshrined in the old English equity court's jolly treatment of
English seamen as members of a happy, fun-loving race (with, one supposes, a
fine sense of rhythm), but certainly not to be trusted to take care of them-
selves. What effect, if any, this had upon the sailors is hidden behind the judi-
cial chuckles as they protected their sailor boys, but one cannot help wonder-
ing how many sailors manage to get credit at a reasonable price. In other
words, the benevolent have a tendency to colonize, whether geographically or
legally.
Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 PA. L. REv. 485,
556-58 (1967). See discussion in note 144, supra.
163. This conflict is not particularly surprising in any public policy. Kennedy, supra
note 102, at 1774. See generally Kessler & Sharpe, supra note 141.
164. It has been noted above that there is something of a trend toward awarding
punitive damages in cases involving egregious nonpayment of insurance policy benefits.
See note 45 supra. The practice of imposing this more affirmative sanction must be kept
within bounds if the market support goals of contract are to be pursued effectively. More
affirmative sanctions than nonenforcement create disincentives for private action. See
note 146 supra.
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D. Macneil: Relational Dispute Resolution or Relational
Exchange Regulation?
Arguably, Professor Macneil's relational theory of contract
law, as presented above, 6 ' has not yet articulated the ultimate
purposes or goals it would set for contract law, and it can rea-
sonably be interpreted to support two different goals. A re-
stricted reading of his theory advocates relational contract law
aimed at dispute resolution only; this approach potentially could
improve the substantive justice of dispute resolution without se-
riously undermining the market support goals of contract law. A
broad reading views the relational theory as compatible with af-
firmative regulation of all exchange behavior; such an approach,
it is submitted, would undermine seriously the market support
goals of contract law. A discussion of these two alternative pos-
sibilities follows, after a brief review of the -expanded scope of
contract law implicit in the relational theory.
Professor Macneil first would broaden the scope of contract
law from the traditional limitation of promises about specific fu-
ture transactions into concern for all aspects of exchange rela-
tionships. He would cease "to equate exchange with discrete
transactions and contract with promise.""" But present law does
not purport to govern all exchange, only exchange based on
promises. It presumes that, if the parties wish to have access to
legal enforcement and legal remedies, their transaction must be
cast in the exchange mold recognized by contract law. Professor
Macneil proposes to change this rule by formulating law which
governs all exchange relations (although presumably coverage
could be avoided by specifying such an exclusion in the con-
tract). 67 The threshold determination by contract law would not
be whether promises were made that related to an exchange
transaction, but whether exchange relations existed and, if so,
the legal consequences flowing from them.16 Thus, the reason-
165. See Section III.B. supra.
166. Macneil, supra note 2, at 696.
167. See id. at 805-15.
168. In a recent work, Professor Macneil assumes that any kind of contract or re-
lationship makes a resulting exchange relational; thus, the parties' relationship can be
extra-exchange and still make the exchange a relational one. Macneil, Contracts: Adjust-
ment of Long Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neo-Classical and Relational
Contract Law, 72 Nw. L. REv. 854, 856-59 (1978). Thus, the potential scope of relational
rules may be very broad indeed.
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ably clear line between legal consequences and no legal conse-
quences would become blurred-more so than by the present
doctrines of promissory estoppel and quasi-contract.
The effect of this broadened scope of application of contract
law will be determined primarily by the ultimate purpose the
body of law is to pursue. This broadened scope has potential to
improve the ability of contract law to articulate market policy
by bringing more types of market conduct within the scope of
contract law. Yet, there are two problems with this extension.
First, there would be substantial weakening of a party's ability
to avoid contract-law implications of given conduct-what the
late Professor Edwin W. Patterson referred to as "freedom from
contract. 169 This problem is exacerbated by the emotive power
of the label "contract." Second, there is some question whether
this doctrinal extension actually will encompass many more
cases. For purposes of analysis, parties who are preparing to
enter into an exchange can be divided into two groups-those
who wish to plan for legal effect and those who do not. Professor
Macneil's new system of contract law would not add meaning-
fully to the law's support of those who wish to plan for future
legal effect; they may plan under present law and this planning
will be enforced by the courts.70 Yet, most commercial con-
tracting parties do not choose to plan for future legal effect.
When these nonplanning parties have a strong exchange rela-
tionship, usually resulting from extended, regularized transac-
tions in the past, modern empirical research indicates that most
will neither bring most of their disputes to the courts nor refer
to contract law when settling among themselves. 17 1 Thus, ex-
panding the scope of contract law will be of little significance to
these parties. When these nonplanning parties do not have an
exchange relationship, a new set of relational contract rules will
likely not reach resolution of their dispute if they do bring it to
court, even though they are more likely to do so. Thus, a new set
of relational rules will have a substantial impact on dispute reso-
169. See, e.g., Patterson, Compulsory Contracts in the Crystal Ball, 43 COLUM. L.
R.v. 732 (1943). See generally Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Con-
trol of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARv. L. REv. 529 (1971).
170. One qualification to this statement should be noted. Under Professor Macneil's
relational system, parties would likely have an enhanced ability to plan for a future ex-
change relationship rather than for future exchange transactions.
171. See text accompanying notes 76-102 supra.
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lution only in those cases in which three circumstances coincide:
when the parties do not plan for future legal effect; when they
have an exchange relationship; and when this relationship is not
sufficiently well-established to provide a basis for dispute resolu-
tion. While it is not unreasonable to expect these first two cir-
cumstances to exist with some regularity, the third seems an
open question.
A narrow reading of Professor Macneil's relational theory
would advocate its use only for the purpose of improving dispute
resolution. Such use is needed, as argued above, because rela-
tional factors do affect the substance of exchange and should be
considered in resolving disputes- arising from exchange.17 2 This
limited purpose of a relational theory finds support in Professor
Macneil's works. He has observed that dispute resolution mech-
anisms are essentially conservative, seeking primarily to preserve
the exchange relationship.1 73 In addition, he has previously
stated that his relational theory is designed to supplement tradi-
tional law rather than to replace it.174 Presumably, a relational
theory aimed at dispute resolution would continue the sanction
of nonenforcement of contract.
There are two primary advantages to a dispute-resolution-
oriented relational system over our present transactional system.
First, such a system should improve the quality of dispute reso-
lution. The court would get a clearer picture of the facts and
172. Macneil, supra note 2, at 805-11. It has been observed that the present system
of contract law may in fact interfere with commercial contracting behavior by introduc-
ing an implicit threat to litigate, which destroys the trust and cooperation necessary in
relationships, McCauley, supra note 24, at 816, by requiring planning for dispute resolu-
tion, which may be disruptive, Macneil, A Primer of Contract Planning, 48 S. CAL. L.
REV. 627, 676 (1975), and by causing students (and by implication all those who work
with the system) to see contract relations as extrapolations of legal doctrines, rather than
viewing legal doctrines as properly responsive to contracting problems. Macneil, Whither
Contracts?, supra note 103, at 416. Professor Reitz concludes that
because of the doctrinal emphasis on noncontractual matters, it is very hard to
place a given set of contract issues in an analytic frame of reference that shows
the proper role of market-based bargains in our 20th century economic system.
We struggle with the old and new devices for policing contracts, for example,
but we act without any solid foundation for such policy analysis. For that ab-
sence, the classical general theory of contracts is largely to blame.
Reitz, supra note 50, at 700.
173. See Macneil, supra note 168, at 895-98.
174. Macneil, supra note 2, at 693. Macneil, however, has also argued that the pre-
sent contract-law system should be viewed as only part of a larger exchange system.
Macneil, supra note 168, at 887-89.
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importance of the parties' exchange relation by focusing on the
relation directly. At present, this information must be smuggled
into court through the back door of proving a fictitious or im-
plicit assent.1 5 Second, such a system would enhance the abili-
ties of parties to plan for future exchanges by giving an en-




There is, however, one potential problem with such a rela-
tional approach. As relational rules are developed, the law would
begin to make certain legal obligations customary incidents of a
particular exchange relationship. Difficulties arise if parties in
such an exchange relationship choose to vary those obligations
by express or implied agreement. The problem is whether the
law will' recognize the parties' own obligations or impose on
them the customary ones. If parties are allowed to plan private
market transactions, then the obligations they have given them-
selves should prevail. The solution would be to recognize the
parties' agreed obligations as the prevailing characteristic of the
exchange relation. Indeed, Professor Macneil's recent work ap-
pears to authorize this result.17' In addition, the idea of enforc-
ing the planning of parties, which runs throughout his work,
would support the correct result. The opposite rule would seri-
ously undermine the ability of contract law to support private
markets.
In summary, relational rules in pursuit of the goal of dis-
pute resolution can improve that process without seriously un-
dermining support for private markets. In addition, such rules
should improve contract law's ability to regulate certain types of
bargaining-process conduct by broadening the focus to consider
explicitly all exchange-related conduct. They can also improve
advancement of the distributional goals of contract by consider-
ing aspects of the exchange relation concerned with the parties'
respective wealth positions. Like traditional contract law, a rela-
tional approach must establish limits on the pursuit of these dis-
175. See Macneil, Presentiation, supra note 103.
176. For a discussion of the difficulty of accomplishing such planning in a transac-
tion-oriented system, see Macneil, supra note 168, at 859-76. See generally id. at 889-95;
Macneil, supra note 2, at 712-20.
177. Macneil notes that a particular exchange relation may make the transactional
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tributional goals to avoid eroding support of private markets.
Also like traditional contract law, a relational approach must
limit itself primarily to the sanctions of compensatory damages
or nonenforcement to avoid dampening private initiative.
A relational rule aimed at dispute resolution, however, will
not be sufficient to serve as the intellectual conduit to reunify
bodies of law previously spun off from contract, one of the objec-
tives of Macneil's relational theory. 17 These bodies of law, such
as corporations and securities, are pursuing more active goals
and, hence, require more affirmative sanctions. 17 '9 Yet, contract
law that adopts affirmative sanctions as its primary regulatory
tool will seriously undercut its capacity to support private
markets.
In contrast with the restricted relational theory discussed
above, a broad relational system would have to regulate all ex-
change relations. For such regulation to take place through the
machinery of dispute resolution, most of the significant disputes
must be brought to the regulatory system, or the system must
reach out and actively bring them in.150 Yet, the empiricists have
demonstrated that most significant commercial disputes are not
now brought into the system. Thus, either a comprehensive sys-
tem of regulation will be required, or the dispute resolution sys-
tem must be changed to cause most disputes to be brought to it.
The prospects are not good for changing dispute resolution
to entice parties in mainstream commercial disputes to use it.
These parties make decisions by comparing the costs of the legal
action, both monetary and nonmonetary, and the benefits to be
gained from it; presumably they are finding presently that the
costs of using courts to resolve most commercial disputes out-
weigh the benefits. The costs of legal action in this situation may
be grouped into four categories. 181 First is the monetary expen-
diture to pay for lawyers, court costs, and other litigating ex-
penses. Second is the disruption of internal business operations
178. See Macneil, supra note 2, at 814-15.
179. Indeed, the need for more affirmative sanctions is one of the primary reasons
that these bodies of law were spun off. For a survey of the extent to which the more
affirmative sanction of punitive damages is being used in some contract cases today, see
note 45 and accompanying text supra.
180. See Milhollin, supra note 17, at 50-51.
181. For a more extensive discussion and citation of authorities, see text accom-
panying notes 78-80 supra.
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by taking employees, particularly high level ones, away from
their jobs. Third is disruption of the immediate commercial rela-
tionship with the other party. Interference with commercial rela-
tionships is a substantial cost of litigation because preservation
of commercial relationships is important to most business par-
ties. Last is the indirect interference with present and future
business relationships by giving the party resorting to litigation
a bad reputation as one who prefers litigating-others may be-
come less desirous of its business. Against these costs can be
weighed two benefits. First, the monetary recovery and other re-
lief which may be ordered. This potential benefit, however, must
be discounted by the probability that the party may not be suc-
cessful. While very little empirical research has been done, it is
generally felt that contract damages awards are too low to afford
realistic compensation. 182 A second possible benefit is establish-
ing a credible threat to deter future improper business conduct.
One way to change the weighing of costs and benefits is to
increase damage awards. This would bring more contract dis-
putes to court only if, overall, benefits would outweigh the costs.
Yet, the internal disruption of business and the interference
with business relationships are likely to be the most important
costs for commercial parties in significant disputes. At present,
it is difficult, if not impossible, to say how much damage awards
would have to be increased to outweigh these costs. If Professor
Macneil's relational rules make business parties more comforta-
ble with litigation and its results, they may lower these commer-
cial relationship disruption costs. Given the adversary nature of
our courts' dispute resolution process, such a result appears un-
likely. Certainly this question should be dealt with before a sys-
tem of relational rules is adopted. The most likely result is that
a comprehensive system of supervision and regulation would be
necessary to bring to the courts most commercially significant
disputes and make relational rules the effective commercial
standards of most commercial parties.18 3 Professor Macneil no-
where advocates such supervision and regulation; however, a
182. See Mueller, supra note 79.
183. Without such regulation, mainstream commercial disputes presumably will
continue to be settled out of court; with it, parties will have substantial difficulties avoid-
ing the legal effect of their actions even when they wish to.
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broad reading of his relational theory can support it.1 84
In this type of regulatory system, the content and substance
of private exchange presumably would be governed by public
standards articulating the terms on which exchange in an ex-
change relationship would take place. In essence, the existence
of an exchange relationship would call forth a set of terms deter-
mined to be good by public authorities. The net result could be
a public, collectivist approach to the terms and substance of
what is presently private exchange.18 5 This conclusion is sup-
ported by the very broad definition of relations in the proposed
system of relational rules18s and by the fundamental notion that
the relation itself "defines the content of the obligation."1 7 Fur-
ther support comes from the argument that Macneil's relational
system can serve as a basis for reunifying areas of contract, such
as labor law and corporations, which have been spun off from
contract law. These areas of law establish affirmative systems of
regulation that include more affirmative sanctions than tradi-
tional contract law. To join them under a grand theory of con-
tract law would require adoption of the same sort of affirmative
regulation and sanctions.
The vice of this system of contract law would be its failure
to support private markets. As argued above, private markets
demand private initiative in pursuit of private profits. Dispute
resolution in support of such markets must enforce the private
bargains brought to it, on the basis of private, individualistic de-
184. In this general context, Speidel states:
But the unanswered question in The Death of Contract is where the new im-
peratives should stop and "freedom from and freedom to" begin. This is, I
believe, the jurisprudential question of our time. Although the conditions for
the exercise of those freedoms in 1975 and 2075 will differ from those in 1880,
what they are and why they are imposed must constantly be identified and
tested.
Speidel, supra note 49, at 1182.
185. Macneil describes his approach as "collectivist." The ideal of the body of con-
tract law would shift from a primarily individualistic approach to a primarily altruistic
approach. Macneil, supra note 2, at 735. It must be stressed that Professor Macneil does
not advocate such a course; however, this broad reading of his relational theory is com-
patible with it. For background and review of traditional justifications, see Kennedy,
supra note 142, at 1735, 1737-40, 1753-60. For historical context, see J. HURST, supra
note 141, at 266, C. JACOBS, supra note 149, at 23-27; G. WHMTE, supra note 143, at 48-61,
133-35.
186. See Macneil, supra note 168, at 887-89.
187. Macneil, supra note 2, at 786.
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terminations of profit and loss, unless enforcement is denied for
a limited, previously articulated reason. Otherwise, private initi-
ative will not be forthcoming. Yet, a system of affirmative regu-
lation and affirmative sanctions would have difficulty granting
enforcement on the basis of a private determination of profit
and loss.188 Indeed, the idea of affirmative regulation calls for
standards and terms of exchange which look to a public calculus
of profit and loss.
Two other fundamental problems exist with a broad rela-
tional theory. To the extent that contract law serves as a moral
guide to contracting parties, affirmative regulation of exchange
relations would undercut the legitimacy of private initiative in
pursuit of private profits. This would seriously weaken the law's
support for private markets. Second, this system would be to-
tally unresponsive to the need for freedom from contract. To
avoid involvement with contract law, one would have to avoid
any involvement with exchange relations.
This maximum relational theory would improve the ability
of contract law to regulate the bargaining process by raising the
cost of improper conduct and, potentially, by removing the lim-
its to this regulation.'89 It also would make contract law's theo-
retical ability to advance its distributional goals almost limitless
by, again, raising the costs of undesirable activities and remov-
ing the limits to pursuit of these results. For the reasons set
forth above, however, this ability could have substantial effect
on contract law's ability to support private markets.
V. CONCLUSION
Contract law exists to advance several diverse goals and tol-
erates this diversity by placing limits on the extent to which
188. Contra Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1717-22, 1745. Professor Macneil is aware
of the importance of private contract to the operation of a modern capitalist society and
is concerned that contract law support this operation. Macneil, Essays on the Nature of
Contract, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 159, 198-200 (1979). My concern is that other aspects of his
theories may not adequately provide this support.
189. Macneil, Essays on the Nature of Contract, 10 N.C. CENT. L.J. 159, 180-93
(1979). Macneil has expressed the view that just as contract must support private mar-
kets, contract must be taught its limits. Id. These limits will come from the other goals
of contract law. As argued above, however, there also must be limits on the pursuit of
these other goals. The concern here is that a broad reading of the relational theory does
not provide such limits.
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they will be pursued.190 Chief among these goals is the protec-
tion and promotion of private markets. The future contract law
which Professor Gilmore sees emerging after contract's Death
has a scope and purpose compatible with those of traditional
contract law. With Professor Macneil's "Many Futures" of con-
tract law, one cannot tell. A narrow reading of his relational the-
ory is largely consistent with the traditional purpose of contract
law. Contract law based on such a narrow reading can serve to
advance the protection and promotion of private markets. There
is a serious concern, however, that a broad reading of his rela-
tional theory is compatible with more affirmative regulation that
would seriously undermine private markets. While private mar-
kets are not sacrosanct, we should not abandon them without a
clear view of how goods and services will be allocated without
them. In addition, we need a clear evaluation of the effect of this
change on the prevailing political, social, and economic norms
related to these markets. The ultimate purposes of contract law
to be pursued and the nature of sanctions used to pursue these
purposes are questions of critical import in determining what re-
lational theory is proposed and whether it should be adopted.
190. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 142, at 1774.
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